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YES, VIRGINIA: THE PRESIDENT CAN DEPLOY FEDERAL
TROOPS TO PREVENT THE Loss OF A MAJOR AMERICAN
CITY FROM A DEVASTATING NATURAL CATASTROPHE
Michael Greenberger'
I. INTRODUcTION
As historians look back on President George W. Bush's eight years in
office, the failure of his Administration to respond decisively and effec-
tively to Hurricane Katrina will doubtless be viewed as the event that be-
gan the unraveling of the nation's confidence in his leadership.2 Central to
the criticism of the federal government in this regard was its indecisiveness
about deploying its substantial military assets to rescue and protect Gulf
Coast citizens overwhelmed by one of the country's worst natural disas-
ters.3 This indecisiveness was the result of the paralyzing effect of a single
Reconstruction era federal statute: the Posse Comitatus Act ("PCA").
That statute provides that "except in cases and under circumstances ex-
pressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress," the armed
forces or federalized National Guard may not be used for domestic law
enforcement.4 While the United States faced the emasculation of, inter
alia, one of the South's largest and most prominent cities,5 federal lawyers
pondered for days whether there were constitutional or statutory excep-
tions to the Posse Comitatus Act that would allow the introduction of fed-
eral troops.6
On October 17, 2006, all doubt about that question was resolved. On
that day, the President signed into law the John Warner National Defense
1. Law School Professor, University of Maryland School of Law; Director, University of Mary-
land Center for Health and Homeland Security ("CHHS"). A.B., Lafayette College; J.D., University of
Pennsylvania. The author wishes to thank CHHS Law Fellow Joshua Easton, J.D., M.A., CHHS Law &
Policy Analyst Catherine Napjus, J.D., and Anthony Villa, J.D. candidate, University of Maryland
School of Law (2007 expected) for their substantial assistance in preparation of this Article.
2. See, e.g., Bruce Alpert, Katrina's Impact Reaches Nation's Political Parties. They've Put Out
Spin for Midterm Voting, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PIcAYUNE, Aug. 26, 2006, at 2; Speaker.gov, Katrina,
http://www.speaker.gov/issues?id=0011 (last visited Jan. 19, 2007).
3. See, e.g., FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND, THE WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO
HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 54 (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/
katrina-lessons-learned; see also Donald F. Thompson, Terrorism and Domestic Response: Can DOD
Help Get It Right, JOINT FORCE Q., Jan. 1, 2006, available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq-pubs/
4003.pdf.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006).
5. Infoplease.com, Top 50 Cities in the U.S. by Population and Rank, http://
www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0763098.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) (estimating populations on July 1,
2005, pre-Hurricane Katrina).
6. See, e.g., Eric Lipton et al., Storm and Crisis: Military Response; Political Issues Snarled Plans
for Troop Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at Al.
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Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 ("DAA of 2007"). 7 A key provision
within this legislation, enacted in response to the Bush Administration's
uncertainty about military deployments during Katrina, amends the Insur-
rection Act to allow the President unilaterally, i.e., without the consent of
the states involved, to deploy federal troops to respond to natural disasters
and other major domestic emergencies.8 That provision became law over
the bi-partisan objection of all fifty state governors who claimed it tramples
upon state sovereignty. 9
Rather than diminishing the authority of the states, however, the DAA
of 2007 merely codifies and clarifies the federal power that existed prior to
its enactment. Indeed, the federal government's ability to decide unilater-
ally to use the armed forces in times of devastating natural disasters was
well established before the law's passage. Unfortunately, however, the use
of this federal power has been consistently misunderstood,1" particularly
the point at which the power comes into effect. Thus, it is important to
stress that this federal authority is only properly triggered when a cata-
strophic event has overwhelmed state and local governments. The federal
government, therefore, has repeatedly acknowledged that, "[m]ost [natural
catastrophes should be] handled on a daily basis at the local level,"'1 be-
cause, in most instances, state and local governments are fully capable of
responding.
The fact that natural disaster response should usually be under state or
local control is a key premise of the federal government's National Re-
sponse Plan ("NRP"), which outlines inter-governmental coordination and
planning during "Incidents of National Significance"-major domestic inci-
dents, the responses to which are often beyond the capabilities of states
and localities alone.' 2 However, as is shown in detail below, in those rare
instances when states and localities are unable to respond, Congress may
7. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364,
120 Stat. 2083 (2006); Jim Garamone, President Signs 2007 Defense Authorization Act, Oct. 17, 2006,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/NewsArticle.aspx?ID= 1650.
8. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 § 1076(a)(1), 120 Stat.
2404-05 (amending 10 U.S.C. § 333); see also George Cahlink, Governors 'Disappointed' with Ex-
panding Federal Role of National Guard, 42 CQ TODAY 18 (2006).
9. Cahlink, supra note 8; see also Press Release, State of Arizona Executive Office, Napolitano
Urges Removal of Provisions in Federal Legislation Usurping Governors' Control of National Guard
(Sept. 20, 2006), available at http://www.governor.state.az.us/dms/upload/NR 092006_National%20
guard%20provisions.pdf [hereinafter Napolitano]; Press Release, Office of Senator Leahy, Hill's Na-
tional Guard Advocates Hold News Conference to Protest DOD Bill's Proposed Decisions on National
Guard (Sept. 19, 2006), available at http://leahysenate.gov/press/200609/091906a.html; Governors Asso-
ciation Opposes Senate Authorization Measure, INSIDE THE ARMY, Sept. 4, 2006, at 35 [hereinafter
Governors Association].
10. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
11. Press Release, FEMA, Joint State/Federal Transportation Exercise Tests Response Plans
(May 5, 2005), available at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=17420 (quoting Federal
Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") Regional Director John Pennington).
12. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN (Dec. 2004), available at http://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRPbaseplan.pdf.
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properly exercise its constitutional powers to authorize the federal govern-
ment to take charge-including sanctioning the deployment of federal
troops without state or local consent.
II. THE POSSE COMITATUs ACT
"[E]xcept in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by
the Constitution or Act of Congress," the PCA prohibits use of the military
to enforce domestic law.13 Enacted in 1878, the PCA was a response to the
imposition of martial law upon the former Confederate States to maintain
civil order.14 Congress was concerned that this use of the U.S. military was
causing that institution to become increasingly politicized and to stray from
its traditional non-civilian function.' 5 However, Congress also clearly rec-
ognized that, by virtue of constitutional authority or statutory authoriza-
tion, exceptions to the general bar would be required in extraordinary
circumstances to preserve law and order.
In the context of this discussion, it is important to understand the dis-
tinctions between the active armed forces and the National Guard. Mem-
bers of the armed forces are in. the active military service of the Army,
Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard. 6 With the exception of
the Coast Guard, members of the armed forces are constrained by the
PCA.17 As Commander in Chief, the U.S. Constitution grants the Presi-
dent control of the operation of the armed forces.'
8
Members of the National Guard are simultaneously members of their
respective state militias and the Army Federal Reserve. 9 The National
Guard traditionally operates under the control of the state and territorial
governors.20 In this state capacity, members of the National Guard are not
constrained by the PCA and may perform civilian law enforcement func-
tions.21 However, National Guard personnel may be called into federal
service (or "federalized") by the President.22 While under federal status
(and thus subject to the PCA), National Guard members may perform
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006).
14. Craig T. Trebilcock, The Myth of Posse Comitatus (Oct. 2000), http://www.homelandsecurity.
org/newjournal/articles/trebilcock.htm.
15. Id.
16. 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(4) (2006).
17. Linda J. Dermaine & Brian Rosen, Process Dangers of Military Involvement in Civil Law
Enforcement: Rectifying the Posse Comitatus Act, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 167, 174-78 (2006).
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
19. Steve Bowman et al., Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response, CONG. RESEARCH SER-
VICE, CRS REP. RL33095, at CRS-6-7 (Sept. 19, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
RL33095.pdf.
20. Id. at CRS-7.
21. Id. National Guard personnel may also have "Title 32" (32 U.S.C. § 502(f)) status, meaning
they are still under control of their governor but receive federal pay and benefits. Bowman et al., supra
note 19, at CRS-8. National Guard personnel with Title 32 status are not constrained by the PCA. Id.;
see also U.S. Northern Command, The Posse Comitatus Act, http://www.northcom.mil/aboutus/
possecomitatus.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
22. Bowman et al., supra note 19, at CRS-9.
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typical disaster relief tasks (such as search and rescue, clearing roads, deliv-
ering supplies, and providing medical assistance), but may not perform law
enforcement functions unless pursuant to a PCA exception.23
On April 17, 2002, President Bush authorized the establishment of the
United States Northern Command ("NORTHCOM") to provide command
and control of Department of Defense ("DOD") defense efforts and to
coordinate defense support of civil authorities within the United States.24
NORTHCOM's assigned area of responsibility "includes air, land, and sea
approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Ca-
nada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical
miles."'25 NORTHCOM assumed its official responsibilities on October 1,
2002.26 The creation of NORTHCOM was the first time since the Civil
War that the United States Armed Forces had operational command for
domestic purposes.27
If federal troops are deployed domestically, NORTHCOM has opera-
tional authority.28 NORTHCOM will designate a Defense Coordinating
Officer ("DCO") to the incident area to serve as the DOD point of contact
for other federal agencies and state and local authorities.29 If necessary,
NORTHCOM will establish a Joint Task Force to coordinate the response
of participating branches of the military.30 As DOD assistance is usually
only required during emergencies that exceed the capabilities of local,
state, and federal agencies, once the lead agency (typically the Federal
Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") 31) can again assume full con-
trol and management of the incident, NORTHCOM is required to relin-
quish operational control.32
III. HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE ABSENCE OF GOVERNMENT
It is now universally recognized that Hurricane Katrina was an unprec-
edented disaster that virtually destroyed a major U.S. city. During the days
following its landfall, chaos reigned in the Gulf Coast region, particularly in
New Orleans. In Louisiana, the state and local governments were incapa-
ble of acting in areas affected by the hurricane, and desperation grew as the
23. Id. at CRS-7 n.21, CRS-9; see U.S. Northern Command, supra note 21.
24. Northcom.mil, U.S. Northern Command About Us, http://www.northcom.mil/aboutus/
aboutus.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Northcom.mil, About Us]; Northcom.mil, U.S.
Northern Command History, http://www.northcom.mil/about-us/history.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2006)
[hereinafter Northcom.mil, History].
25. Northcom.mil, About Us, supra note 24.
26. Id.
27. Laura K. Donohue, Pentagon Spies Are Watching You, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 2006, at B13.
28. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOMELAND DEFENSE: DOD NEEDS TO ASSESS THE STRUC-
TURE OF U.S. FORCES FOR DOMESTIC MILITARY OPERATIONS, GAO-03-670, at 5-7 (July 2003), availa-
ble at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03670.pdf (Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, U.S.
House of Representatives).
29. Bowman et al., supra note 19, at CRS-3.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Northcom.mil, About Us, supra note 24.
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public sector "seemed unable to meet its basic compact with its citizens. 33
Evacuations were ordered that could not be executed. 34 Basic civil services
were nil: "the power was out, the roads were unnavigable, communication
was [all but] nonexistent, 35 fires burned untended,36 and rescue efforts
were "a fugue of improvisation. '37  In short, the sheer magnitude of the
catastrophe effectively shut down the state and local governments.
Hurricane Katrina impacted almost 93,000 square miles across 138
parishes and counties. 38 Estimates of the property damage caused by Ka-
trina are approaching the $100 billion mark, which makes it the costliest
disaster in U.S. history.39 The official death toll is 1697. 40 In addition to
the fatalities, about 770,000 people were displaced from their homes.4'
Even a year after landfall, most public schools are still shuttered, hospitals
are crippled, the court system is dysfunctional, and power outages are so
frequent that they are deemed a non-event.42
Commerce was affected throughout the nation as a result of the hurri-
cane. In its immediate aftermath, the destruction sent thousands of victims
across state borders in search of food and shelter and required delivery of
relief workers and supplies from across the nation. 43 Major national indus-
tries were closed or their operations dramatically reduced. 44 Katrina se-
verely impaired substantial portions of the country's oil refineries and
curtailed offshore production of oil and gas.45 As a result, the nation ex-
perienced a sharp and immediate spike in gasoline prices.46
33. Susan B. Glasser & Michael Grunwald, The Steady Buildup to a City's Chaos; Confusion
Reigned at Every Level of Government, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2005, at Al. See Brandon Bain, Escape
from New Orleans, NEWSDAY, Sept. 10, 2005, at A7.
34. Glasser & Grunwald, supra note 33.
35. Id.
36. James Janega & Angela Rozas, Progress, with Limits; Death, Disease Still a Threat As Down-
town Clears, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 4, 2006, at 1.
37. Glasser & Grunwald, supra note 33.
38. TOWNSEND, supra note 3, at 5.
39. Id. at 5-7.
40. TheCajuns.com, Hurricanes in Louisiana History, http://www.thecajuns.com/lahurri-
canes.htm# Monday,_August_29,_2005_-_Hurricane_Katrina (last visited Jan. 19, 2007).
41. Id.
42. Jennifer Moses, Hurry Up and Wait, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2006, at A15.
43. See James Dao, Off the Map; No Fixed Address, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at Al (discussing
"resettling evacuees" from the Gulf Coast who fled to other states after Katrina); Kirk Johnson et al.,
President Visits As New Orleans Sees Some Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, at Al (describing the
extent of relief efforts from all over the nation); Robert D. McFadden & Ralph Blumenthal, Bush Sees
Long Recovery for New Orleans; 30,000 Troops in Largest U.S. Relief Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2005,
at Al (illustrating evacuation attempts for the city of New Orleans as well as Mayor C. Ray Nagin's fear
that the hurricane might have killed thousands in his city).
44. See Prices for Energy Futures Soar in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31,
2005, at C2, C4 ("Economists warned that Katrina was likely to leave a deeper mark on the national
economy than previous hurricanes because of its profound disruption to the Gulf of Mexico's complex
energy supply network .... The airline industry felt the delayed brunt of Hurricane Katrina, with some
airports running low on jet fuel and carriers canceling hundreds more flights.").
45. Jad Mouawad & Simon Romero, Gas Prices Surge As Supply Drops, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1,
2005, at Al.
46. Some states reached higher gas prices than they had ever experienced pre-Katrina. See Asso-
ciated Press, Gasoline Pricing Violations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at 14NJ-6 ("New Jersey's gasoline
prices hit their highest levels ever on Labor Day, averaging $3.16 a gallon for regular ...."); Jad
2006]
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In the absence of a state and local governmental presence, lawlessness
consumed the city of New Orleans. It was widely reported that:
"Looting was widespread, sometimes in full view of out-
numbered police and often unarmed [Louisiana] National
Guard troops;"47
"A hospital crew in the midst of moving a patient was fired
on by a sniper, and the police chief said rapes were reported
in the Convention Center, where some officers were beaten
by an angry crowd;"48
"[R]eports of carjackings, shootings, lootings and rapes
reached authorities, who admitted that much of New Orle-
ans ha[d] slipped from their control;"4 9 and
"The police themselves may have helped trigger the lawless-
ness, as reports that some of their own had engaged in loot-
ing swept through the city."50
This lawlessness contributed to the sub-human conditions experienced
at the New Orleans Superdome and Convention Center. The following in-
clude some descriptions of the havoc within these structures in which refu-
gees were forced to seek shelter during Katrina: "horrible prison;" "the
darkest hole in the world;" "the place I want to forget;" and "hell."51 The
Superdome had been designated by New Orleans as "a shelter of last re-
sort, never meant to hold storm refugees for long."52 Nonetheless, it
housed about 20,000 people between August 29 and September 4, 2005."
Even having designated the Superdome as a shelter of last resort, neither
the State of Louisiana nor the city had plans to stock the facility with food
and water.54 FEMA provided the facility with 90,000 liters of water and
Mouawad, Storm Stretches Refiners Past a Perilous Point, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at 27 ("The hurri-
cane also knocked off a dozen refineries at the peak of summer demand, sending oil prices higher and
gasoline prices to inflation-adjusted records."); Mouawad & Romero, supra note 45, at Al ("While
gasoline averaged $2.60 a gallon earlier in the week [of Aug. 29 to Sept. 2], unleaded regular gas was
selling [on Aug. 31] at $3.09 at stations in West Palm Beach, Fla.; $3.49 in Indianapolis; and $3.25 in San
Francisco. Premium fuel was going for up to $3.89 a gallon in Chicago.").
47. See Glasser & Grunwald, supra note 33.
48. Douglas Birch et al., Ruined City Turns Violent; Thousands of Guard Troops Try to Restore
Order; In New Orleans, Looting in Streets, Rapes at Shelter and Bodies on Sidewalks; Katrina's Wake,
BALT. SUN, Sept. 2, 2005, at 1A.
49. Lee Hancock & Michael Grabell, 'Desperate SOS' Amid Hunger, Thirst and Lawlessness;
Frustrations Boil Over in New Orleans, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 2, 2005, at 1A.
50. Evan Thomas, The Lost City, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42.
51. Paul Salopek & Deborah Horan, How Places of Refuge Went to Hell, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 15,
2005, at 1.
52. Id.
53. Jeff Goldblatt et al., 'It Is Not Safe in New Orleans' (Aug. 31, 2005), http://www.foxnews.
com/story/0,2933,167781,00.html; Salopek & Horan, supra note 51; Eric Lipton et al., Breakdowns
Marked Path from Hurricane to Anarchy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at 1.
54. Salopek & Horan, supra note 51.
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43,776 military meals, but these rations were inadequate and lines for food
were two hours long while supplies lasted. The desperation and violence
that occurred at the Superdome was aggravated by horrendous condi-
tions.56 Lost power meant no air conditioning and backed up toilets.5" The
stench was so bad that medical workers wore masks, and thousands of
retching people had to be moved outside the dome.58
One advantage that refugees at the Superdome enjoyed, however, was
that persons entering that facility had been searched for weapons.59 Such
precautions were not taken at the Ernest N. Morial Convention Center.6 °
Consequently, violence at the Convention Center exceeded even that at
the Superdome. 61 The Convention Center was never intended to hold ref-
ugees even as a last resort.62 Yet, that structure held 15,000 people during
those fateful days. 63 The situation at the Convention Center (also without
power and swelteringly hot) was described by Captain Winn, the head of
the police SWAT team, as "completely lawless. '64 Gunfire was routine.65
There were several reports of women being dragged off by groups of men
and gang-raped.66 Captain Winn found a corpse with multiple stab
wounds.67 The beleaguered eighty to ninety New Orleans police officers,
already at a severe disadvantage of numbers, could only rush into the dark-
ness with flashlights after seeing muzzle flashes. 68 Even when culprits were
caught, no temporary holding cells had been set up to hold them.
69
In summary, Katrina was a catastrophe of such magnitude that state
and local resources were completely overwhelmed and the respective gov-
ernmental institutions were diminished to the point of nonexistence.
IV. THE MILITARY RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA
As early as August 19, the Secretary of Defense delegated authority to
deploy DOD assets to NORTHCOM in anticipation of the hurricane's
arrival on the Florida Atlantic coast.7 0 On August 24, NORTHCOM Oper-
ations Directorate began conducting teleconferences among entities such




58. Id.; Salopek & Horan, supra note 51.
59. Lipton et al., supra note 6.
60. Id.
61. Id.; Salopek & Horan, supra note 51.
62. Salopek& Horan, supra note 51.
63. Id.
64. Lipton et al., supra note 6; Salopek & Horan, supra note 51.
65. Lipton et al., supra note 6.
66. Id.
67. Salopek & Horan, supra note 51.
68. Lipton et al., supra note 6.
69. Id.
70. S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, HURRICANE KATRINA: A
NATION STILL UNPREPARED, at 26-13 (May 2006), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/Katrina/
FullReport.pdf [hereinafter S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC.].
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of the Mississippi River, respectively), and the supporting commands of the
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.71 On August 30, the day after Katrina
made landfall, the Deputy Secretary of Defense informed NORTHCOM's
Commander that he had a "blank check" for DOD resources he believed
were necessary for the response effort.72
The evening of Monday, August 29 (the day of Katrina's landfall in
Louisiana), Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco made her now infamous
plea for President Bush to send "everything you have got. ' 73 Over the
next two days, Governor Blanco refined her request by asking for troops
from the President at least two more times, once asking for 40,000 federal
troops.74 President Bush promised 7200 federal troops on Saturday, five
days after landfall. 75 Although Governor Blanco "wouldn't have turned
down federal troops," she did not want a federal takeover of the disaster
relief effort.76 She wished to maintain primary reliance on National Guard
troops while using federal troops under Louisiana control for traditional
disaster relief tasks that do not amount to law enforcement.77 Yet, given
the state of chaos in the Gulf Coast region, Pentagon and military officials
were hesitant to send in federal troops under Governor Blanco's control-
especially if those troops did not have law enforcement authority.
78
Both President Bush and White House Chief of Staff Andy Card
pressed Governor Blanco to request a federal takeover of the relief effort
so that federal troops could be deployed to restore law and order.79 Gov-
ernor Blanco, concerned that it was tantamount to a federal declaration of
martial law, balked at the suggestion.8" The Bush administration then sent
Governor Blanco a proposed legal memorandum asking her to request a
federal takeover, which she rejected. 1 She also rejected a more modest
proposal for a hybrid command structure under which a three-star general
who had been sworn into the Louisiana National Guard would command
all troops-both state and federalized National Guard and armed services
troops.8 2
These appeasing measures at that stage of crisis were thought to be
necessary because the Bush administration then believed that the PCA
barred deployment of troops to restore order. The investigation into the
legality of invoking the Insurrection Act, an exception to the PCA that
71. Id. at 26-15.
72. Id. at 26-12.
73. Id. at 26-30.
74. Id. at 26-46.
75. Id.
76. Glasser & Grunwald, supra note 33.
77. S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., supra note 70, at 26-48; see supra note 23 and accompanying
text for a list of typical disaster relief tasks that do not amount to law enforcement.
78. Lipton et al., supra note 6.
79. Glasser & Grunwald, supra note 33.
80. Manuel Roig-Franzia & Spencer Hsu, Many Evacuated, but Thousands Still Waiting, WASH.
POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/09/
03/AR2005090301680.html; Glasser & Grunwald, supra note 33.
81. Roig-Franzia & Hsu, supra note 80.
82. Lipton et al., supra note 6.
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would allow federal troops to enforce civil law, led to "a flurry of meetings
at the Justice Department, the White House and other agencies '83 and
erupted into "a fierce debate."84 The White House instructed the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") to resolve the issue. The
OLC finally "concluded the federal government had authority to move in
even over the objection of local officials."85
This confusion over the scope of the PCA reigned despite the fact that
in December 2004, thirty-two federal officials, under the leadership of the
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), promulgated the NRP de-
signed to provide federally directed coordination of responses to natural
and manmade disasters amounting to "Incidents of National Signifi-
cance." 86 The NRP expressly provides that when facing "imminently seri-
ous conditions," the military may be called upon to take any and all action
necessary "to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate property
damage." Neither the White House, DHS, nor the remaining thirty-one
agencies who signed on to the NRP realized in late August and early Sep-
tember 2005 that, as of December 2004, the federal government was on
record as authorizing the kind of federal leadership that was so disastrously
delayed for five days after landfall.
Even after OLC authorized, inter alia, the sending in of federal troops,
the leadership of the Justice Department and DOD urged President Bush
not to take command of the relief effort due to fears that Governor Blanco
would refuse surrendering control, thus causing a political backlash.87 One
senior administration official, speaking anonymously, questioned:
Can you imagine how it would have been perceived if a
president of the United States of one party had pre-emp-
tively taken from the female governor of another party the
command and control of her forces, unless the security situ-
ation made it completely clear that she was unable to effec-
tively execute her command authority and that lawlessness
was the inevitable result?
88
Ultimately (but belatedly), on "September 7, DOD assets in the af-
fected area included 42,990 National Guard personnel, 17,417 active duty
personnel, 20 U.S. ships, 360 helicopters, and 93 fixed wing aircraft. '89 A
week and a half after the hurricane made landfall, 50,000 National Guard
troops and 22,000 active duty troops were on the ground in the Gulf Coast
83. Id.
84. Glasser & Grunwald, supra note 33.
85. Lipton et al., supra note 6.
86. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 12, at v-viii, 4.
87. Lipton et al., supra note 6.
88. Id.
89. Bowman et al., supra note 19, at CRS-6.
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region, constituting the largest deployment of troops within the United
States since the Civil War.90
On September 15, 2005, in his speech at Jackson Square in New Orle-
ans, President Bush stated: "It is now clear that a challenge on this scale
requires greater federal authority and a broader role for the armed forces
.... "91 Shortly thereafter, on October 19, 2005, Governors Michael Huck-
abee (R-Ark.) and Janet Napolitano (D-Ariz.), then Chair and Vice Chair
of the National Governors Association, respectively, directly contradicted
President Bush's sentiment, stating: "State and local governments are in
the best position to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disaster and
emergency. 
92
V. CATASTROPHIC NATURAL DISASTERS WARRANT
FEDERAL TROOP DEPLOYMENT
Even before the clarifying language within the DAA of 2007 was en-
acted on October 17, 2006, there was an abundance of authority (as the
NRP so clearly stated in December 2004) that, when confronted with over-
whelmed state and local entities, in a time of disaster of nationwide conse-
quence, the federal government may deploy federal troops to lead the
response to the incident even in the face of state and local opposition.93 In
so stating, it bears repeating that, when, as is usually true, the state and
local governments are capable of mounting a response and maintaining law
and order, the latter institutions retain governmental leadership of a cata-
strophic response.94 In such instances, the federal government, where
properly requested, should supplement, not take over, the state and local
command structure. As the NRP repeatedly notes, the lowest level of gov-
ernment that can handle a disaster should retain leadership over the re-
sponse. 95 Given the enormity of Katrina, however, the only level of
government with the assets to handle the incident was the federal govern-
ment, acting through, inter alia, military deployments. Katrina and disas-
ters of that magnitude present "security situation[s that] ma[k]e it
completely clear that [states are] unable to effectively execute . . .com-
mand authority and that lawlessness [is] the inevitable result."96 Thus, as is
shown below, even before the DAA of 2007, and now certainly after it, the
90. S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., supra note 70, at 26-11.
91. Press Release, The White House, President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to the
Nation (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050915-8.html.
92. Federalism and Disaster Response: Examining the Roles and Responsibilities of Local, State,
and Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (state-
ment of Janet Napolitano, Governor of Arizona), http://www.homelandsecurity.az.gov/documents/
101905-GovernorsTestimony.pdf.
93. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 12.
94. For example, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act is the
most prominent statutory program authorizing federal supplemental aid to states and localities during
disasters and emergencies. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3231-35, 5121-22, 5131-34, 5141, 5143-44, 5147-65, 5170-74,
5176-77, 5179-89, 5191-93, 5195-97, 5201, 5205 (2006).
95. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 12.
96. Lipton et al., supra note 6.
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President has the power to federalize a relief effort by deploying federal
troops.
VI. EXCEPTIONS TO THE PCA
Despite the seemingly clear expression of congressional intent, the
PCA has been "riddled with uncertainty and complexity."97 Much of this
uncertainty concerns the PCA's exceptions, which authorize federal troop
deployment through the Constitution or federal statute.98 Confusion arises
often as to which exceptions apply, when they apply, and what their scope
is.9 9 This legal uncertainty was most prominent during Katrina as the Bush
administration scrambled to determine whether the President could feder-
alize the response effort, especially through deployment of federal troops,
even in the face of state opposition. 100 This Article discusses two critically
important PCA exceptions-the Insurrection Act and the Homeland Se-
curity Act of 2002-as well as their constitutional underpinnings.
A. The Insurrection Act
Even prior to the recent clarifying amendment within the DAA of
2007, the Insurrection Act permitted the use of the federal military (includ-
ing the armed forces and federalized National Guard - collectively referred
to hereinafter as "federal troops") to enforce civilian laws in response to
insurrections and similar types of civil disturbance.10'
For example, in 1992, President George H.W. Bush used federal
troops to quell the Los Angeles riots upon the request of California's gov-
ernor pursuant to the Insurrection Act's first provision, which states:
10 2
Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against its
government, the President may, upon the request of its leg-
islature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be con-
vened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the
other States, in the number requested by that State, and use
such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to sup-
press the insurrection.
1 0 3
97. Dermaine & Rosen, supra note 17, at 170.
98. In addition to constitutional exceptions to the PCA, one commentator has identified at least
twenty-six statutory exceptions to the PCA. CHARLES DOYLE, THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT AND RE-
LATED MATTERS: THE USE OF THE MILITARY TO EXECUTE CIVILIAN LAW, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE,
CRS REPORT 95-964 S, at CRS-21 n.48 (June 1, 2000), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/95-
964.pdf.
99. Dermaine & Rosen, supra note 17, at 170-71.
100. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Dermaine & Rosen, supra note 17, at 193-94.
102. See, e.g., Nicholas Lemann, Comment: Insurrection, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 9, 2005, availa-
ble at http://www.newyorker.com/talk/content/artices/050926ta talk-lemann.
103. 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2006).
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While this provision of the Insurrection Act requires the request of a
governor or state legislature, the next two provisions of that statute do not.
For example, section 332 states:
Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstruc-
tions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the
authority of the United States, make it impracticable to en-
force the laws of the United States in any State by the ordi-
nary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal
service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the
armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those
laws or to suppress the rebellion.1"4
Thus, section 332 permits the President to decide unilaterally to deploy
federal troops, even in the absence of state request, to restore the ability to
enforce federal law. Under an early version of this provision, President
Washington, in 1794, used the military to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion
to enforce a federal excise tax on liquor.10 5
Moreover, before the recent amendment, section 333 of the Insurrec-
tion Act provided:
The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or
both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he
considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection,
domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if
it-(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State,
and of the United States within the State, that any part or
class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity,
or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law,
and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail,
or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to
give that protection; or(2) opposes or obstructs the execu-
tion of the laws of the United States or impedes the course
of justice under those laws.
10 6
This provision therefore allows the President to use federal troops,
even in the absence of state requests, to ensure citizens are provided with
the protections of constitutional or statutory law when the "constituted au-
thorities of that State are unable" to enforce state and/or federal law.
Under this provision, in 1957 and 1963, Presidents Eisenhower and Ken-
nedy, respectively, unilaterally sent troops into southern states to enforce
constitutionally protected civil rights through desegregation. 10 7
104. 10 U.S.C. § 332 (2006).
105. See, e.g., Virginia.edu, The Papers of George Washington: The Whiskey Insurrection, http://
gwpapers.virginia.edu/documents/whiskey/index.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2006).
106. 10 U.S.C. § 333 (1998).
107. Lemann, supra note 102.
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Therefore, even before its recent amendment by the DAA of 2007,
sections 332 and/or 333 of the Insurrection Act were deemed to be impor-
tant exceptions to the PCA, since they permit the President to use federal
troops to restore law and order when state governments are not able to do
SO.
B. The Homeland Security Act of 2002
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 ("HSA") °8 was signed into law
on November 25, 2002.1°9 This sweeping legislation created DHS, whose
duties were to "analyze threats, [ ] guard our borders and airports, protect
our critical infrastructure, and coordinate the response of our nation for
future emergencies." ' ° Under Title V of the HSA, entitled "Emergency
Preparedness and Response," the Act broadly defines the roles of the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security, "acting through the Under Secretary [of
Homeland Security] for Emergency Preparedness and Response."11
[The role] include[s] [ ] helping to ensure the effectiveness
of emergency response providers to terrorist attacks, major
disasters, and other emergencies;... [managing] the Federal
Government's response to terrorist attacks and major disas-
ters[;] ... aiding the recovery from terrorist attacks and ma-
jor disasters; [ ] building a comprehensive national incident
management system with Federal, State, and local govern-
ment personnel, agencies, and authorities, to respond to
such attacks and disasters; [and] [ ] consolidating existing
Federal government emergency response plans into a single,
coordinated national response plan .... 112
In response to the HSA, the President issued Homeland Security Pres-
idential Directive 5 ("HSPD-5"), 1 13 assigning the DHS Secretary the re-
sponsibility of developing a National Incident Management System
("NIMS") to provide a "nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local
governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, re-
spond to and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or
complexity."' 14 HSPD-5 also implemented HSA's mandate that "a
108. 5 U.S.C. app. § 3 8J, §§ 1401-02, 3319, 3321, 3323-25 (1996); 6 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 111-13,
121-22, 131-34, 141-45, 161-65, 181-93, 201-03, 211-18, 231-38, 251-56, 271-79, 291-98, 311-21, 331,
341-46, 361, 381, 391-95, 411-13, 421-28, 441-44, 451-68, 481-84, 491-96, 511-12, 521-22, 531-33,
541-43, 551-57 (2002); 18 U.S.C. § 3051 (2000); 44 U.S.C. § 3537-38 (1991 & Supp. 2006); 49 U.S.C.
§ 44921 (1997).
109. Press Release, The White House, President Bush Signs Homeland Security Act (Nov. 25,
2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021125-6.html.
110. Id.
111. 6 U.S.C. § 312 (2006).
112. Id. § 312(1), (3)(A), (4)-(6) (2006).
113. Press Release, The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 (Feb.
28, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html.
114. Id. at (15).
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coordinated national response plan," i.e., the NRP, be developed to "inte-
grate Federal Government domestic prevention, preparedness, response,
and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan." '115
Under the authority vested in the HSA and HSPD-5, the NRP
1 16 com-
mits every signatory to it, including (but not limited to) each member of the
federal executive cabinet, to "[s]upport[ ] NRP concepts, processes, and
structures and carrying out their assigned functional responsibilities to en-
sure effective and efficient incident management ....
The NRP is activated when the DHS Secretary declares an incident to
be an "Incident of National Significance." '118 It further defines "cata-
strophic events" as the most severe Incidents of National Significance:
A catastrophic event is [an] ... incident ... that results in
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage or disrup-
tion severely affecting the population, infrastructure, envi-
ronment, economy, national morale, and/or government
functions ... result[ing] in sustained national impacts over a
prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceed[ing]
resources normally available to State, local, tribal and pri-
vate-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly
interrupts governmental operations and emergency services
to such an extent that national security could be threatened
119
In an event that "exceeds resources normally available to State [and]
local . . . authorities," "[t]he primary mission is to save lives; protect critical
infrastructure, property, and the environment; contain the event; and pre-
serve national security."1 ' In addition, "[s]tandard procedures regarding
requests for assistance may be expedited or, under extreme circumstances,
suspended in the immediate aftermath of an event of catastrophic magni-
tude,"1 ' and any "coordination process[es] must not delay or impede the
rapid deployment and use of critical resources. 122 Recognizing that the
NRP, as derived from the HSA and HSPD-5, mandates expedited and ef-
fective response to a catastrophic event causing massive loss of life and
destruction to property, accompanied by a breakdown of state and local
government, it unsurprisingly and expressly states that DOD should "take
necessary action to respond to requests of civil authorities consistent with
the [PCA]. ' 123
115. Id. at (16).
116. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 12.
117. Id. at iii.
118. Id. at 4.
119. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 44.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 43.
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In light of the HSA (and HSPD-5 and the NRP which derive from it),
the deep and widespread lawlessness that occurred in New Orleans during
Katrina would have justified the President in using the military to aid law
enforcement to save lives and contain the event.
C. The Recent Clarifying Amendment to the Insurrection Act
The recent amendment to the Insurrection Act within the DAA of
2007 removes all doubt about the President's ability to decide unilaterally
to use federal troops to respond to a massive disaster such as that exper-
ienced as a result of Hurricane Katrina. Following Katrina, there was a
series of congressional and White House reports which each made it clear
that the President must use federal troops to prevent and respond to natu-
ral disasters of this kind. During the DAA of 2007's consideration, the
Senate Committee on Armed Services pointed to "the lack of explicit [stat-
utory] references to such situations as natural disasters or terrorist attacks
[that] may have contributed to a reluctance to use the armed forces in situ-
ations such as Hurricane Katrina.' 1 24 The House Committee on Armed
Services similarly noted "that there are a number of areas where [DOD]
could have improved the execution of military support during Hurricane
Katrina. "125 These congressional sentiments echoed White House con-
cerns expressed in its Lessons Learned, which recommended that, in the
future, DHS and DOD "should jointly plan for [DOD's] support of Federal
response activities as well as those extraordinary circumstances when it is
appropriate for the [DOD] to lead the Federal response.
126
In response to these broad based concerns, Congress amended the In-
surrection Act to make it clear that the President, when he determines dur-
ing, inter alia, a "natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious pubic health
emergency... [that] the constituted authorities of the State... are incapa-
ble of maintaining public order," he may "employ the armed forces, includ-
ing the National Guard in Federal service.'
12 7
124. S. REP. No. 109-254, at title X, subtitle E, § 1042 (2006).
125. H.R. REP. No. 109-452, at 370 (2006).
126. See TowNSEND, supra note 3, at 54-55
127. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364,
§ 1076(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2083, 2404-05 (2006) (amending 10 U.S.C. § 333). The amendment states in full:
(a) Use of armed forces in major public emergencies.
(1) The President may employ the armed forces, including the National Guard in Federal
service, to-
(A) restore public order and enforce the laws of the United States when, as a result of
a natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist
attack or incident, or other condition in any State or possession of the United
States, the President determines that-
(i) domestic violence has occurred to such an extent that the constituted author-
ities of the State or possession are incapable of maintaining public order; and
(ii) such violence results in a condition described in paragraph (2); or
(B) suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination,
or conspiracy if such insurrection, violation, combination, or conspiracy results in
a condition described in paragraph (2).
(2) A condition described in this paragraph is a condition that-
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VII. FEDERAL VERSUS STATE POWER
All fifty state governors opposed the DAA of 2007's amendment to
the Insurrection Act.128 In August 2006, the National Governors Associa-
tion, led by its Chair, Janet Napolitano (D-Ariz.), sent a series of letters to
lawmakers and to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld asking for removal of the
"federalization" provision from the DAA of 2007.129 Governor Napolitano
argued that the congressional "proposals represent[ ] a dramatic expansion
of Federal authority during natural disasters that could cause confusion in
the command-and-control of the National Guard and interfere with States'
ability to respond to natural disasters within their borders."13 Governor
Mike Huckabee (R-Ark.) complained that the "provision was drafted with-
out consultation or input from governors and represents an unprecedented
shift in authority from governors as Commanders and [sic] Chief of the
Guard to the Federal government." 13 ' Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)
voiced congressional concerns supporting the governors' position by argu-
ing that "[w]e can deal with a range of situations at home if the people and
resources of the National Guard remain regularly under the control of the
officials who are closest to managing these situations.'
'13 2
However, this criticism overlooks the principal controlling caveat
within the amendment. It is not triggered until the President makes a find-
ing, as clearly could have been made in Katrina, that the states are "una-
ble" to respond to the disaster. As has been historically true, even serious
natural disasters will stay within the control of the states when they main-
tain the ability to sustain or restore order. This is reflected in the default
rule within the NRP, i.e., that disasters should be dealt with at the lowest
level of government possible.'33 Stated most pointedly, this measure does
(A) so hinders the execution of the laws of a State or possession, as applicable, and of
the United States within that State or possession, that any part or class of its
people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the
Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State or
possession are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity,
or to give that protection; or
(B) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes
the course of justice under those laws.
(3) In any situation covered by paragraph (1)(B), the state shall be considered to have
denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.
(b) Notice to Congress. The President shall notify Congress of the determination to exercise
the authority in subsection (a)(1)(A) as soon as practicable after the determination and
every 14 days thereafter during the duration of the exercise of that authrority.
128. Letter from Mike Huckabee, Ark. Governor et al., to Bill First [sic], U.S. Senate Majority
Leader et al. (Aug. 6, 2006), available at http://www.nga.org/portallsite/nga/menuitem.cb6e7818b34088d
18a278110501010a0/?vgnextoid=lffb60a8l2ffc01OVgnVCM100000la0l00aRCRD; Jennifer Stein-
hauer, 51 Governors Resist Authority over Guard, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 15, 2006, at A14.
129. Governors Association, supra note 9; Napolitano, supra note 9.
130. Letter from Janet Napolitano, Ariz. Governor et al., to Bill Frist, U.S. Senate Majority
Leader et al. (Aug. 31, 2006), available at http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.cb6e7818b34088
d18a27811050l010a0/?vgnextoid=0a05e362c5f5d010VgnVCM1000001a01010aRCRD.
131. Letter from Mike Huckabee to Bill First [sic], supra note 128; see also Napolitano, supra note
9.
132. Press Release, Office of Senator Leahy, supra note 9.
133. Indeed, the NRP "contemplates a coordinated, real time response with the states and locali-
ties working together with the federal government, deploying federal assets as a supplement to state
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not interfere with state sovereignty because it is only trigged when there is
no sovereignty within the state.
Moreover, the Constitution clearly authorizes Congress to maintain
order during a catastrophe of national significance when the states are inca-
pable of doing so. Three constitutional provisions provide Congress with
this authority: the Insurrection Clause, the Republican Form of Govern-
ment Clause, and the Commerce Clause.' 34
VIII. THE INSURRECTION CLAUSE
The Insurrection Clause affords Congress the power "[t]o provide for
calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insur-
rections and repel Invasions."13 It is the source of authority for the Insur-
rection Act and that statute's recent amendment within the DAA of 2007.
As noted above, the Insurrection Act, even prior to the recent amendment,
was employed to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion, to enforce desegregation
orders in the South, and, most recently, to quell the Rodney King riots in
Los Angeles.1 36 In each of these situations, either the affected state recog-
nized that it was incapable of maintaining order or the President unilater-
ally determined that was the case and federal troops were used to restore
order. As discussed above, Katrina clearly invited use of the Insurrection
Act insofar as neither the state nor local governments were able to protect
even the most basic civil rights of the residents of New Orleans. 137 Even
prior to the passage of the DAA of 2007, and even in cases where the states
have not invited federal intervention, there has never been a serious argu-
ment advanced that it is unconstitutional to use federal troops when the
states and localities are incapable of enforcing law and maintaining order.
IX. THE GUARANTEE OF A REPUBLICAN FORM OF
GOVERNMENT CLAUSE
The complete breakdown of orderly governmental services within
New Orleans also triggered the constitutional guarantees provided in the
Republican Form of Government Clause, which provides: "The United
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Ap-
plication of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature can-
not be convened) against domestic Violence." '138 Faced with lawlessness
and disorder in the immediate wake of Katrina, there was not only a failure
and local supervision of an emergency response. Only in a worst-case scenario would the federal gov-
ernment find it necessary to direct and supervise the relief effort." Michael Greenberger, False Con-
flict: Who's in Charge of National Public Health Catastrophes, 31 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 2, 2 (2006).
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; art. IV, § 4; & art. I, § 8, cl. 3, respectively.
135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
136. See supra notes 102-107 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 34-69 and accompanying text.
138. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added). For an in-depth look at the Republican Form of
Government Clause, see generally Jason Mazzone, The Security Constitution, 53 UCLA L. REV. 29
(2005).
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of Louisiana and New Orleans to provide a "republican form of govern-
ment" to the citizens of New Orleans, but there was a failure to provide
any form of government. Any effort by the President to intervene to re-
store order and governmental services to New Orleans and to end the
havoc and chaos experienced there would have been fully justified by this
constitutional responsibility assigned to the federal government. This con-
stitutional provision would have been an additional basis fully supporting
the unilateral decision to introduce federal troops in the face of the inabil-
ity to act by the state and the city. Again, it is self-evident that federal
actions necessary to preserve a "republican form of government" cannot be
impeded by a claim of state and/or local sovereignty when the state and
locality cannot act to limit the kind of widespread suffering Katrina
imposed.
X. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Finally, as highlighted above,139 Katrina also imposed a substantial ad-
verse impact on interstate commerce throughout the nation. Thousands
crossed state lines in search of refuge through choked lines of egress.
140
Goods and services necessary for survival and safety were brought into the
region either inconsistently and in a disorganized manner or not at all.
14 1
On a nationwide basis, industrial services and manufacturing were reduced
or terminated. The price of commodities soared throughout the nation-
most noticeably the price of gasoline
The Commerce Clause provides that Congress has the power "[t]o reg-
ulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes. ' 142 To the extent the Insurrection Act affords the
President the right to unilaterally insert federal troops to restore order
within an area devastated by a catastrophic event, that action can also be
justified as appropriate under the Commerce Clause, as it almost certainly
mitigates the adverse impact on interstate commerce. To that extent, it is
clear the Insurrection Act would be used to "[r]egulate those activities hav-
ing a substantial relation to interstate commerce .... i.e., those activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce.
143
While some have argued that recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence
substantially limits congressional intrusion on the states' constitutional po-
lice powers, 144 even the Commerce Clause tests enunciated therein would
support the use of the Insurrection Act to deal with incidents such as
139. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
140. Dao, supra note 43.
141. Lipton et al., supra note 53.
142. U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
143. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 558-59 (1995).
144. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Theory and Practice in the Constitutional Design, 11
HEALTH MATRIX 265, 289-91 (2001) (relying, inter alia, on Lopez, 514 US. at 549-50); see also Morri-
son, 529 U.S. at 602.
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Katrina. 45 However, all doubts about the scope of the Commerce Clause
in confronting a federal response to a public health crisis have been re-
moved by the recent case of Gonzales v. Raich.1 46 That case strongly sug-
gests that such events will almost always be deemed to "substantially affect
interstate commerce" and, thus, subject to federal regulation.
In Raich, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress, through the Con-
trolled Substances Act, 47 could regulate entirely intrastate commerce in
marijuana and preempt state legislation supporting such commerce, be-
cause the production in question affected interstate commerce by endan-
gering the nation's public health. 148 As discussed above, both in the
immediate and extended aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, interstate com-
merce was dramatically imperiled.149 Considering Raich's confirmation of
federal authority over state regulation of even purely local economic activi-
ties if they have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, any major cat-
astrophic incident is likely to be considered a proper use by Congress of its
commerce powers, as such incidents, like Katrina, will almost always sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce. 5 ° Indeed, it would be a high irony if
a single governor, unable to mount an effective governmental response,
could simultaneously defeat the federal government's attempt to mitigate a
disaster's highly damaging commercial impact on the entire nation.
In short, just as the Justice Department's OLC concluded during Ka-
trina, the President did have the authority to federalize the response effort
at the time by using federal troops. 5' With the force of the Constitution's
Insurrection Clause, Republican Form of Government Clause, and Com-
merce Clause, the President could have invoked the second or third clauses
of the Insurrection Act as exceptions to the PCA. Unfortunately, confu-
sion and politics stayed the President's hand in using this power when it
was needed during Katrina.152 The recent amendment to the Insurrection
Act provides clarification so that neither confusion nor politics need do so
in the future.
XI. CONCLUSION
In summary, the DAA of 2007's amendment to the Insurrection Act
creates a bright line for determining the appropriate use of federal troops
during major domestic natural disasters. The amendment clearly provides
that, under extreme circumstances when state and local governments are
145. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
146. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
147. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-802, 811-814, 821-830, 841-844(a), 846-853, 854-864, 871-881, 882-887,
889-904 (2006).
148. Raich, 545 U.S. at 15.
149. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
150. Michael Greenberger, The Alfonse and Gaston of Governmental Response to National Public
Health Emergencies: Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina for the Federal Government and the
States, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 611 (2006).
151. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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overwhelmed by response efforts to a major catastrophic event such as a
natural disaster, the federal government may use federal troops to restore
public order. Although this power was widely recognized to predate the
amendment, the confusion surrounding the legality of its use resulted in
delay and inaction during Hurricane Katrina that may have cost many lives
and imposed great suffering on those who survived. The amendment
neither adds to the President's power, nor detracts from the sovereignty of
the states. It merely ensures that should an event like Katrina recur, the
uncertainty surrounding these powers will not cause similar delay and/or
inaction.
